One important meta-ethical distinction concerns the split between ethical subjectivism and ethical objectivism. Moral subjectivists claim that there are no moral truths, and that moral propositions cannot be true or false. Ethical objectivists think that there are objective moral truths.
It is my contention that the meta-ethical subjectivism/objectivism dichotomy can be reconciled. While the two may seem incompatible on the surface, there is no fundamental incompatibility between these distinctions, only differences based on perspective. Subjectivism and objectivism are actually complementary to one another.
I concede that ethical objectivism and ethical subjectivism are prima facie incompatible. Some level of meta-ethical subjectivism is inevitable because of limited facts, knowledge and perspective at the individual level. Moral truth is somewhat subjective for each person because of imperfect, atomistic knowledge. But subjectivism at the individual level does not preclude the existence of moral truth external to us at the objective, eternal level. Just because we are not aware, or not fully aware of objective moral truth, does not mean that objective truth does not exist externally.
Truth cannot be fully known without all relevant facts. Absolute, objective truth is based on omniscience; being in possession of all the facts, and combining perfect rational, intuitive and eternal knowledge. Relative truth is subjective, based on imperfect knowledge, and on the facts available to us, not all extant facts.